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1. Introduction 
The focus of this essay is the variegated phenomenon of social pacts, a 
term currently used to refer to a range of widely differing practices 
involving different places ( the firm, the territory, the State), but that 
derive from the same inspiration or strategy which, for lack of a more 
evocative term, can be defined as partnership. The spread of practices 
based on the concept of partnership is such that in the meta-language of 
European Community institutions the term is gradually replacing what 
was once referred to by the glorious expression “social dialogue” 
1. 
                                                 
1 The Community document in which clear reference is made to partnership is “Commission 
of the European Communities, Green Paper - Partnership for a new organisation of work”, 
COM (97) 128 Final (April 1997). In important previous documents the predominant 
reference is to social dialogue, v. “Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper 
– European Social Policy - Options for the Union”, COM (93) 551 Final (November 1993) at 
71-75 § IIIC5, despite a far-sighted reference to the setting up of networks and 
partnerships as an alternative to legislation in the process of evolution towards globalism Id. 
at 82-84, § IIIC9; and above all the 1994 White Paper, “Commission of the European 
Communities, European Social Policy – A Way Forward for the Union – A White Paper”, COM 
(94) 333 Final (July 1994), part A at 55-58 § VIII, part B at 15-17 § 78-85. For references 
to social dialogue, see also “Commission of the European Communities, Commission 
Communication concerning the Development of the Social Dialogue at Community level”, 
COM (96) 448 Final (September 1996); European Parliament, Resolution on the Commission 
communication concerning the development of the social dialogue in “European dialogue at 
Community level”, O.J. C 286/338 (1997). Starting with the Green Paper quoted above, 
there has been an increasing number of documentis in which reference to partnership is 
prevalent, cf. “European Parliament, Resolution on the Commission Green Paper 
'Partnership for a new organization of work'”, O.J. C 14/34 (1998); Economic and Social 
Committee, Opinion on 'Cooperation with charitable associations as economic and social 
partners in the field of social welfare', O.J. C 73/92 (1998); Economic and Social 
Committee, Opinion on the 'Green Paper - Partnership for a new organization of work', O.J. 
C 73/122 (1998); Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the 
Commission - Social action programme (1998-2000)”, COM (98) 259 Final (April 1998) at 5 
§ III; Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission 
adapting and promoting the social dialogue at Community level”, COM (98) 322 Final (May 
1998) at 19-21 § 6.2-6.4; Commission of the European Communities, Commission 
discussion paper ‘The Commission and non-governmental organisations: building a stronge 
partnership’, COM (2000) 11 Final (January 2000). Reference to partnership is also to be 
found in official speeches made by authoritative members of the Commission: " Social 
Partnership in Action ", Speech by Commissioner Padraig Flynn  , Leicester, 10.9.1998, 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/employment_social/speeches/980910pf.html>; “European 
social model - social dialogue; New challenges: Global economy, enlargement”, Address by 
Allan Larsson, Director General - DG Employment and Social Affairs, Austrian Presidency 
Conference, Vienna, 9-10.11.1998, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/employment_social/ 
speeches/981110al.html>; “Cooperative modernisation: role of the social partners 
",  Address by Allan Larsson, Director General - DG Employment and Social Affairs, Hans 
Bockler and Bertelsmann Foundations and ETUI, Brussels, 28.4.1999,<http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/dgs/employment_social/speeches/990428al.html>;" Modernisation of Europe and the 
role of social partners ", Speech by Allan Larsson, Director General - DG Employment and DECENTRALISED SOCIAL PACTS, TRADE UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  3 
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The analysis that follows will deliberately gloss over agreements at a 
macro level, that is, the national-level social pacts (social pacts in the 
real sense according to the terminology of the European Foundation) that 
spread throughout Europe in the 1990s (above all in Italy, Spain, Greece 
Finland, Holland, Portugal and Ireland) and, towards the end of the 
second millennium, even proposed, albeit on as yet weak grounds, in a 
refractory country like the UK 
2. The focus of the paper will be on the 
meso and micro levels (regional or local as far as territory is concerned, 
sector or plant level as regards the traditional workplace).  
At these levels, innovations in practices based on the concept of 
partnership and their impact on labour law and industrial relations 
systems seem to be more significant and represent an aspect on which 
little light has as yet been shed 
3. 
More specifically, the attempt will be to show that, terminological 
uncertainty apart, the “social partnership” or social pact label is often a 
blanket term used to refer to widely differing practices presenting varying 
degrees of innovation as compared with traditional bilateral contractual 
relationships at the plant or industry-wide level.  
Following an analysis of the diversity of partnership practices that are 
common in Europe, the final part of the essay will give indications of a 
number of new research prospects that suggest themselves to labour law 
                                                                                                                              
Social Affairs, Presidency Conference on the Social Dialogue, Helsinki, 
2.11.1999,<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/employment_social/speeches/991102al.p
df>; " The Social Partners and the modernisation of work organisation", Speech by Allan 
Larsson, Director General - DG Employment and Social Affairs, Conference on the Future of 
Workers' Co-determination in the Netherlands in a European context, The Hague, 6.4.2000, 
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/employment _social/speeches/000406al.pdf>.  
2  There is a vast amount of literature regarding social pacts and it in part coincides with 
that on social concertation: the reader is referred to G. Fertag and P. Pochet (eds.), Social 
Pacts in Europe - New Dynamics ,  ETUI/OSE, 2000; for slight hints at hypotheses of 
concertation in legislative processes in the UK, above all due to the necessity of adapting to 
Community directives, for example as regards working hours, see  W. Brown, “Putting 
Partnership into Practice in Britain”, BJIR, vol. 38, n. 2, 2000, pp. 299-316. G. Ricci “L’orario 
di lavoro in Gran Bretagna”, to be published in B. Caruso – R. De Luca Tamajo (eds.), Il 
diritto del lavoro nell’Unione Europea. Francia, Germania, Gran Bretagna, Spagna, Vol II, 
Regimi di orario e lavori atipici, ESI, 2001.  A more marked trend towards new practices 
based on partnership in public authorities has been seen above all since the Labour Party 
came to power; cf. I. Roper, “Quality management and Trade Union in local services”, ER, 
vol 22, n. 5, 2000 pp.442-466; also N. Heaton, B. Mason, J. Morgan, “Trade unions and 
partnership in the health service” ER, vol. 22, n. 4, 2000, pp. 315-333. 
3  See H. Collins, “Regulating the Employment Relation for Competitiveness” in ILJ, vol. 30, 
issue 1, 2001, 49-71; A. Hyde, “Employee Identity Caucuses in Silicon Valley: Can they 
Transcend the Boundaries of the Firm?, in LLJ, August 1997, 491-97; K.V.V. Stone, 
“Employment Regulation in a Boundaryless Workplace”, paper presented at V Intell 
Conference, Toronto, September 2000. 4                                                BRUNO CARUSO 
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scholars who wish to investigate their impact on conventional contractual 
relationships and traditional models of trade union representation. They 
also end up by touching a problem that is an old but still topical one for 
labour law scholars: the complex framework of the sources of the 
discipline and the mutual relationships between the various regulatory 
subsystems. 
 
2. Regulation via social pacts: the various levels. 
In the Commission’s first report on industrial relations the philosophy of 
concertation (and models of governance based on social partnership) are 
explicitly recognised as a “strategic” regulatory initiative in the era of 
globalisation
4. 
From the launch of a common European employment policy (Council of 
Essen, 1994)
5 up to the above-mentioned report, the Commission made 
constant reference to regulation via partnership, a concept poised 
somewhere between a prescriptive indication issued to governments and 
social partners and recognition of actual models based on this strategy 
operating in various guises throughout Europe.  
That social partnership has become a model towards which the various 
European national systems are uniformly converging, and which above all 
represents a response in terms of domestic stability, is, however, a 
hypothesis about which several doubts have been expressed
6 . 
It appears clear, however, that of the basic regulation strategies – 
regulation via the state (of a hierarchic or political nature) where the 
State structures conflicts, distributes resources and co-ordinates groups 
and activities, market-controlled regulation, and regulation via co-
operation/reciprocity based on values, norms and identities, including 
agreements between large interest groups
7 – the Community has 
definitely decided to promote the latter. 
The choice does not appear to have been made by chance: it is 
strategically consistent with the European social model of Neo-
voluntarism
8, which is considered to be the most adequate response to 
                                                 
4  COM(2000) 113 final REPORT, Industrial relations in Europe – 2000, p. 7  
5 For a recent reconstruction of Community employment policies, see M. Barbera, Dopo 
Amsterdam. I nuovi confini del diritto sociale comunitario, Brescia, PIE, 2000, pp. 101 ff. 
6 See M. Regini, “Social pacts in the EC Report on Industrial Relations in Europe”, in this 
volume. Id., “ Between Deregulation and Social pacts: The Responses of European 
Economies to Globalisation”, P&S, Vol. 28, March 2000, 5-33. 
7 P. La Galès, ” La nuova political economy delle città e delle regioni”, S&M, n. 52, April 
1998, p. 58.   
8 W. Streeck, “Neo-voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?, ELJ, Vol. 1, n.1, 
pp. 31-59. DECENTRALISED SOCIAL PACTS, TRADE UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  5 
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the pressure of global competition and the need for the functional 
specialisation of production systems
9. It is also in line with domestic 
trends in national systems towards new forms of concertation as an 
alternative to the neo-corporative practices of the 80s
10, practices based 
on organised  decentralisation
11 in which the method of concertation is 
shifted from the centre to the periphery, in terms of both territory and 
enterprise, where regulation has a greater freedom of movement but still 
remains within the framework of objectives laid out by central 
authorities
12.  
It seems, however, appropriate to analyse the phenomenon from 
different angles. 
Although regulation via social pacts is a phenomenon that has spread 
throughout Europe, it is important to stress that it reflects converging but 
different trends. 
With reference to the traditional system of industrial relations of the 
bilateral kind, the spread of social pacts in Europe is authoritatively 
viewed
13 as being a symptom, perhaps the most evident one, of a 
readjustment of industrial relations in co-operative terms in order to cope 
with the pressure of international competition: an endogenous response 
to the system of industrial relations made by social  partners  to face 
external constraints and tension, a readjustment of industrial relations 
                                                 
9 F. Traxler, “The logic of Social Pacts” in G. Fajertag and P. Pochet, Social Pacts in Europe, 
Brussels, ETUI, 1997, p. 29. F. Traxler and B. Woitech, “Transnational Investment and 
National Labour Market Regimes: A case of ‘Regime Shopping’ “, EJIR, vol. 6, n., 2000, pp. 
141-159.  C. Crouch, “The Globalised Economy: An End to the Age of Industrial Citizenship” 
in T. Wilthagen (ed.) Advancing theory in labour law and industrial relations in a global 
context,  1998 , Amsterdam; North Holland. 
10 M. Regini, “Between  deregulation”, cit. in n. 6; J. Visser, “Two Cheers for Corporatism, 
One for the Market: Industrial Relations, Wage Moderation and Job Growth in the 
Netherlands”, BJIR, v. 36, n. 2, June 1998, pp. 262-292.    
11 F. Traxler, “Farewell to Labour Market Associations? Organised versus Disorganised 
Decentralisation as a Map for Industrial Relations”, in C. Crouch and F. Traxler, Organised 
Industrial Relations in Europe: What Future? Aldershot, Avebury, 1995. P. Margisson and K. 
Sisson, “European Collective Bargaining: A Virtual Prospect?”, JCMS, vol. 36, n. 4, p. 511 ff. 
12 G. Fajertag and P. Pochet, Social Pacts in Europe, cit. in n 2,. Chapter 1; also P. Pochet, 
“Les pactes sociaux dans le années 1990”, ST, n. 2, 1998, pp. 173-190. 
13 Here again there is a large amount of literature. See P. Cappelli, The New Deal at Work, 
Boston, Harvard, Business School Press, 1999. H. C. Katz and O. Darbishire, Converging 
Divergences, Worldwide Changes in Employment Systems, Ithaca, ILR Press, 2000 ; S.J. 
Frenkel – M. Korczynski- K. A. Shire – M. Tam, On the Front Line, Organization of Work in 
the Information Economy , Ithaca and London, ILR Press , 1999. 6                                                BRUNO CARUSO 
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with the aim of achieving competitive and productive advantage and not 
a protective and re-distributive trend
14.  
With reference to the institutional sphere of relations between public 
actors and the system of industrial relations (at a national level), the rise 
of social pacts represents something else if not something different: 
according to the typology of state intervention in industrial relations and 
the labour market proposed by Cella and Bordogna
15, the logic behind 
social pacts is no longer that of promoting industrial relations (and 
interest groups), but correcting and defining the objectives of the 
collective bargaining systems and the practices of the actors involved, in 
relation to internal and external economic and budget constraints: thus a 
consensual, not directly regulatory, definition and/or correction of 
objectives, without the exchange of political advantages and resources 
that was typical of concertation settlements in the 80s, based on the 
philosophy of redistribution in which the participants were rewarded with 
institutional accreditation and legitimacy
16. 
Lastly, with reference to the (supranational) sphere of the European 
social model, the promotion of territorial social pacts, which accompanies 
the attempt to govern institutional social policies launched in Maastricht,  
is one of the most significant tools, and at the same time one of the 
symptoms, of the polycentric and horizontal, rather than hierarchical and 
vertical, Europeanisation of social systems. This polycentric 
Europeanisation would appear to represent an alternative to the birth of a 
unified European social model, that is, a strategy of co-ordination rather 
than harmonisation of national diversities
17.  
In this strategy, the organised decentralisation of  industrial relations, 
and above all their territorial organisation by means of second-generation 
social pacts, bring new protagonists to the forefront (local actors, even of 
an institutional nature such as chambers of commerce, universities, 
autonomous local bodies, interest groups and environmental protection 
groups), as well as regulatory strategies and techniques. The latter, 
                                                 
14 W. Streeck, “Il modello sociale europeo: dalla redistribuzione alla solidarietà 
competitiva”, SM, n.59, 2000, p. 13.  
15 L. Bordogna and G.P. Cella , “Admission, exclusion, correction: the changing role of the 
state in industrial relations”, Transfer, 1-2, 1999, p. 21 ff. In general see also F. Traxler, 
“The state in industrial relations: A cross-national analysis of developments and 
socioeconomic effects”, EJPR, vol. 36, 1999, pp. 55-85. 
16 With reference to Italy, see M. Regini “Le implicazioni teoriche della concertazione 
italiana” GDLRI, n.72, 1996, pp. 729-743. 
17  W. Streeck, “Il modello europeo” cit. in n. 13, p. 11,  DECENTRALISED SOCIAL PACTS, TRADE UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  7 
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although new, always reproduce parts of past strategies due to a peculiar 
mechanism of “self-referential resistance” that old systems possess
18.  
Empirical research anyway does not confirm the systematic prevalence of 
new post-Fordist industrial relations based on partnership over the old 
model based on conflictual relations oriented towards the redistribution of 
productivity at the plant level
19. However, their experimental relevance 
and introduction in several Continental European countries stress their 
value as a significant trend, signalling a possible transition towards new 
industrial relations which justifies an analysis of their innovative features.  
Finally, it should be added that the phenomena of diversification and 
specialisation facing modern economies (industrial districts, niche 
enterprise and production, regional and sectorial economic vocations) and 
the consequent deregulation processes will probably strengthen the 
process of “converging divergences”
20 of industrial relations systems ( 
that is, the convergence and, at the same time, internal diversification, of 
national systems).  
As a consequence, the “contingent”
21 spread of partnership agreements 
within the various national systems will favour (or will very probably 
become the main instrument of) internal diversification in systems of 
industrial relations, affecting national regulatory uniformity represented 
by the two pillars of labour law: labour law legislation which generally 
cannot be derogated and standard national agreements, which are likely 
to become more varied and diversified in proportion to their inherent 
binding effect, depending on the domestic political and institutional 
situation.   
It seems quite plausible, in fact, to posit a direct correlation between the 
de-regulatory and re-regulatory capacity of social pacts (and their 
spread) and institutional reform in national states in the direction of 
federalism, accompanied by processes of decentralisation of the systems 
of contractual relations. 
 
                                                 
18 G. Sapelli, “Le relazioni industriali europee: riflessioni sulle line di tendenze per 
l’elaborazione di uno schema interpretativo”, manuscript to be published, 2000, p. 6; W. K. 
Roche, “The End of New Industrial Relations?, EJIR,  vol. 6, n. 3, 2000, pp. 261-282; in 
general about the ‘false novelty’ of flexible work, R., Sennet, The corrosion of character. The 
personal consequences of Work in the New Capitalism, New York - London, Norton & 
Company, 1999.  
19 In this sense, see above all W.K. Roche, “ The End of New Industrial Relations?”, cit. in 
n.18. 
20 H. C. Katz and O. Darbishire, Converging Divergences, cit. in n. 13; P. Margisson and K. 
Sisson, “European Collective Bargaining”, cit. in n. 11 
21 W. K. Roche “ The End of New Industrial Relations?”, cit. in n. 18, 275 –6. 8                                                BRUNO CARUSO 
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3. Social partnership at the plant and territorial level 
If this is the general trend, however, theoretical studies and empirical 
investigations into social pacts would seem to point to a need for 
definition, so as to distinguish between what is really new in this new 
concept of “social partnership” and what amounts to déjà vu. 
It is, however, obviously not only a problem of definition: for labour law 
scholars dealing with social pacts as related to legal norms  and the 
institutional actors involved, the need to distinguish between typologies 
and models is necessary and heuristically profitable in the attempt to 
follow the tortuous, and at times highly refined, paths taken by 
regulatory diversification and systemic complexity.  
In studies on industrial relations it also appears necessary to distinguish 
between the various models of social pacts, not only to focalise 
observation of this social phenomenon, but also to gain a clearer 
understanding of the  regulatory strategies in various national contexts, 
in relation to the role of the state and other public actors
22.  
So, focusing on social pacts at an intermediate and local level there 
seems to be a clear distinction, even on the terminological plane, 
between  Territorial Employment Pacts ( henceforward referred to as 
TEPs) and Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness (PECs)
23. From a 
functional viewpoint both aim to use the method of  concertation for the 
controlled introduction of various forms of microeconomic flexibility  in 
both the internal and external labour markets. On the regulatory plane, 
both seem to result in de-standardisation and a consequent regulatory 
differentiation.  
Both types of pact therefore re-propose an updated version of social 
partnership with a common objective: how to reconcile competitiveness 
on the part of entrepreneurial and territorial systems with the right to 
work, seen as security and stability for workers in a context of greater 
mobility and flexibility, and as an increase in job opportunities for the 
weaker social groups (the long-term unemployed, the young, women, 
immigrants, etc.). Both follow the three guiding principles of the social 
and economic policy in post-Fordist economies, at least in its European 
version: flexibility, competitiveness, and job security. 
                                                 
22  M. Regini “Social pacts ”, cit. in n. 6. L. Bordogna and G.P. Cella , “Admission, exclusion, 
correction ”, cit. in n. 15  
23 See the documents of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions: K. Sisson and A. Martin Artiles  “Handling Restructuring Collective 
Agreements on Employment and Competitiveness”, Dublin 2000; S. Zagelmeyer   
“Innovative Agreements on Employment and Competitiveness in the European Union and 
Norway, Dublin, 2000. K. Sisson, J. Freyssinet, H. Krieger, K. O’Kelly. C. Schnabel, H. 
Sefert,  “Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness Concepts and Issues”, Dublin 1999. DECENTRALISED SOCIAL PACTS, TRADE UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  9 
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However, besides these common macro-objectives the two types of pact 
seem to present different dynamics as regards the logic of the action of 
the actors involved ; and equally different are the problems they raise 
regarding their relationship with the system regulating employment 
relationships, in both  contractual and legislative terms . 
4. Are pacts for employment and competitiveness 
(PEC) a new model of collective bargaining? 
In the form outlined in a study by the European Foundation
24, Pacts for 
Employment and Competitiveness reflect well-known institutional 
dynamics, such that it appears at times difficult to make out, as far as 
the actors and contents are concerned, how this model of collaborative 
non-adversarial bargaining differs from the concession and/or solidarity-
based bargaining that was introduced as an absolute novelty in the 80s, 
at a time when big companies were restructuring the Fordist organisation 
of work and job design 
25. 
According to the authors of the European Foundation study, however, 
PECs differ from the concession bargaining typical of the 80s in two ways: 
the disappearance of the unilateral nature of the exchange
26 and the 
compensation they offer in terms of employment opportunities or 
improvements in job quality (safeguarding and at times increasing 
existing employment, protecting weak groups such as the young, women 
and the long-term unemployed, and introducing vocational and in-service 
training schemes).  
However, this distinguishing feature seems in many respects to be 
disputable: only if the American notion
27 of concession bargaining is 
assumed is it possible to speak of innovation. If the only innovative 
element as compared with the concession bargaining of the 80s were the 
introduction of bilateral, reciprocal  exchange instead of the unilateral 
                                                 
24 Besides the research carried out by the European Dublin Foundation referred to in n. 23, 
cf. H. Krieger, “A Vote of Confidence for Collective Bargaining in Europe: New Developments 
in Company Level Employment Pacts” in this volume; EIRO Annual Review 1999, Dublin, 
2000. A. Ferner & R. Hyman (eds.), Changing Industrial Relations in Europe,  Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1998. 
25 K. Sisson and A. Martin Artiles  “Handling Restructuring Collective Agreements on 
Employment and Competitiveness” op. cit. in n. 23, p. 6 . 
26 The concession bargaining that spread in the USA in the ‘80s was substantially trade 
union ratification of unilateral management decisions; cf. P. Cappelli, “Plant Level 
Concession Bargaining, ILRR, vol.38, n. 3, 1985, pp. 90 ss.; P. Cappelli – R.B. McKersie, 
“Labor and the Crisis in Collective Bargaining”, in Challenges and Choices facing American 
Labor, edited by T.A. Kochan, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1985 . 
27 Giving up acquired advantages in exchange for job protection is an element of the notion 
of concession bargaining inserted in the European Employment and Industrial Relations 
Glossary: France, edited by A. Lyon, Caen, London, Sweet & Maxwelll, n. 524. 10                                                BRUNO CARUSO 
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nature of trade union concessions, it would not, in the ultimate analysis, 
amount to much. As the Foundation report acknowledges, the European 
model of concession negotiation in the 80s contemplated types of 
contract in which there was always an element of compensatory 
exchange (for example, forgoing acquired or future benefits in exchange 
for an increase in employment, and above all a reduction in or freeze on 
collective dismissals)
28. If we exclude Great Britain, merely unilateral 
concession bargaining was seldom present in Europe . 
It appears evident from the Foundation study, however, that PECs are of 
great strategic importance; unlike the concession bargaining of the 80s, 
they do not seem to be a contingent, defensive response to occupational 
and organisational upheavals caused by the conversion and restructuring 
of large Tayloristic firms or to the constraints of “the management of 
uncertainty”
29. 
On the contrary, PECs seem to introduce a model of industrial relations 
that is structurally more stable and far-sighted, based on partnership in 
which the pacts do not lay down regulations governing employment but 
rather construct a network of institutions and processes  that are capable 
of continually adapting pre-existing rules and introducing new, shared 
ones that allow for the flexible management of labour oriented towards a 
common goal of increasing competitiveness, reducing costs and 
protecting employment and job quality.  
Given their specific functional characteristics, PECs therefore signal a 
trend towards transformation of industrial relations systems with 
reference to the logic, structure and contents of traditional collective 
bargaining of the distributive or acquisitive kind; at this stage, however, 
the transformation does not seem to entail a radical upheaval of the 
conventional system of industrial relations (and rules)
30. On the contrary, 
PECs would appear to go alongside traditional collective agreements and 
not necessarily replace them, with a view to integrating the system but 
with different objectives.  
I t  i s  q u i t e  c l e a r ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  P ECs represent a distinct difference as 
compared with a period dominated by essentially distributive bargaining, 
for at least three reasons which are summarised below. 
                                                 
28 For the Italian experience, see B. Caruso, Rappresentanza sindacale e consenso, Milano, 
Angeli, 1992, pp. 153 ff.        
29 W. Streeck “The uncertainties of management in the management of uncertainty: 
employers, labour relations and industrial adjustment in the 1980s”, Berlin: 
Wissenschaftszentrum, 1986 
30 H. Krieger, “A Vote of Confidence for Collective Bargaining in Europe …” op. cit. in n. 24, 
p. 13, for data on the spread of PECs. DECENTRALISED SOCIAL PACTS, TRADE UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  11 
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A) The first reason refers to their main contents and the more steadily 
co-operative and less conflictual role of trade unions and work councils: 
PECs concentrate on the idea of competitiveness and production 
efficiency based on a philosophy of great collaboration between 
management, workers and their representatives in view of future benefits 
instead of the conflictual distribution of productivity results already 
achieved . In terms of industrial relations theory, this is equivalent to 
passing from zero-sum distributive bargaining to positive-sum integrative 
bargaining in which all the actors involved will benefit by the advantages 
typical of micro-concertation protecting the interests of each component 
inside the enterprise (labour and managerial technocracy), perhaps in 
conflict with similar but opposing external interests (in the case of large 
multinational companies or groups of firms, for example, competition 
could arise between units belonging to the same group)
31.  
 B) The second reason typically refers to managerial strategies: in these 
contractual practices management would take on an increasingly 
prominent role, no longer being subject to trade union demands as it was 
under distributive bargaining, but taking a more active part in the 
dialogue.  
This further innovative aspect is directly connected with the 
organisational transformations affecting enterprise, especially larger 
companies, due to divisionalisation, the provision of autonomous budgets 
for peripheral units, or overseas units in the case of multinational 
companies, and the decentralisation of operations
32, with the assumption 
of a management philosophy based on management by performance 
rather than by task. All this implies the possibility of splitting up the 
models of industrial relations in the various sectors involved and the 
various production units of groups of firms or multinational companies, as 
well as greater management autonomy: management would no longer be 
homogeneous throughout a big company, but by virtuous use of human 
resources and relations with trade unions and workers’ representatives 
would contribute to the possibility of success in “internal competition”.  
C) The third reason refers to the role of public actors in industrial 
relations. In this respect, PECs represent, in general, a trend towards the 
pursuing of public employment policies  through bilateral negotiation   
                                                 
31 K .  S i s s o n ,  J .  F r e y s s i n e t ,  H .  K r i e g e r ,  K .  O ’ K e l l y .  C .  S c h n a b e l ,  H .  S e f e r t ,   “ P a c t s  f o r  
Employment and Competitiveness Concepts and Issues”, op. cit. in n 23, pp. 36-37; K. 
Sisson and A. Martin Artiles  “Handling Restructuring Collective Agreements on Employment 
and Competitiveness” op. cit. in n. 23, p. 7. 
32 In general, cf. H. Collins, “ Flexibility and Empowerment”,  in T. Wilthagen (ed.)   
Advancing theory in labour law and industrial relations in a global context, Amsterdam, 
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(collective private autonomy) , a policy which was not unknown in Italy in 
the 80s
33.  
In the case of PECs (unlike territorial employment pacts, see infra) the 
role of the public actors involved seems, however, to be more “reactive” 
than “active”, that is, focusing more on reacting to and conditioning 
proposals, inclinations and aims coming from the social partners, than on 
imposing their own
34. The role of many public authorities, in fact, is 
confined to that of “selectively policing” the financial incentives to be 
distributed and acting as a “hidden supporter”, external to pacts aiming 
at increasing competitiveness and protecting employment. The European 
Foundation study summarises the functions of public actors in PECs by 
referring to them as monitors of the effectively co-operative nature of the 
agreements, as ”honest brokers” ensuring that the agreements are drawn 
up through the normal public mediation channels (for example, ANACT - 
Agence Nationale pour l’Amelioration des Conditions du Travail - in 
France, and ACAS in the UK) and as financing measures to facilitate 
PECs, to create a favourable context for the negotiation process.  
In short, this new model of collective bargaining differs from the 
traditional one in that it aims at increasing a company’s competitiveness, 
seen as an objective common to all those taking part in the agreement 
(including workers’ representatives), a common objective that affects its 
contents, the dynamic of relations between the actors, and the regulatory 
mechanisms. 
It therefore seems evident that the significance of PECs goes beyond the 
fact that it is in harmony with the aims of work organisation and 
production in the post-Fordist era.  
It is, in fact, possible to identify further innovative elements of a more 
fundamental importance, relating to both 1) the overall transformation of 
industrial relations and 2) the traditional labour law regulation 
mechanisms. 
  1) As far as the first point is concerned, PECs seem to be able to 
reconcile what in the current debate regarding the “new industrial 
relations” appears to many observers to be irreconcilable
35: that is, a) on 
the one hand, legitimisation of collective bargaining as a method of joint 
regulation of employment relations, which shows an increasing tendency 
to resemble the participatory approach : thus a single method that goes 
                                                 
33 See M. D’Antona, “Pubblici poteri nel mercato del lavoro, amministrazioni e 
contrattazione collettiva nella legislazione recente” (1987) now in Massimo D’Antona Opere, 
edited by B. Caruso and S. Sciarra, Milan, Giuffrè, vol. III, Book 2, pp. 669-736.  
34 M.R. Damaska, I volti della giustizia e del potere, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1991, pp. 49 ff. 
35 W. K. Roche, “The End of New Industrial Relations?, cit. in n. 18. p 268 ff.. DECENTRALISED SOCIAL PACTS, TRADE UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  13 
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beyond the tendential dualism between participation and bargaining and 
the consequent recognition and institutionalisation of the role of trade 
unions and work councils (where supported by law); b) on the other 
hand, personnel management methods based on the philosophy of 
Human Management Relations (HMR), which are normally considered to 
be incompatible with trade union bargaining in that they come under the 
unilateral jurisdiction of management.  
In other words, the alchemy of PECs lies in their use of the partnership 
method to insert, within a framework of concerted rules, managerial 
initiatives that provide for the individual involvement of workers in the 
organisation of production processes, in sharing the greater productivity 
and financial wealth resulting from their participation and in the 
improvement of services offered to internal and external clients and users 
(above all in the privatised public service sector: airlines, banks, postal 
services etc.).  
2) As far as the effects on labour law are concerned, PECs are the most 
appropriate instruments to overcome varying degrees of legal and 
contractual rigidity (depending on the national system concerned) and to 
base derogation or flexible adaptation of standard rules of employment 
protection, both legal and conventional, on the mutual consent of those 
directly involved. This applies both where the statute law explicitly hands 
the task over to trade unions
36 and where it does not explicitly provide for 
any derogation
37. This refers to the specific requirements of local and/or 
company markets, providing the opportunity to create differentiated 
regimes on a contractual basis .  
It should be pointed out that even in systems where the constraints of 
statute laws or standard collective agreements do not appear to be so 
rigid as to force management to have recourse to consensual agreements 
in order to implement strategies of flexibility, PECs have been introduced 
because of the disadvantages of potentially conflict-generating unilateral 
decisions (which are unacceptable given the complexity and rigidity of 
competitive company planning)
38. Besides this, unilateral decisions, not 
blessed with consensual legitimacy, are not appropriate when human 
resource management methods aim at a high degree of personnel 
involvement (team work, performance-related pay, profit-sharing 
                                                 
36 As happens, for example,. in Italy, Sweden or Germany, cf. Sisson and A. Martin Artiles  
“Handling Restructuring Collective Agreements…” op. cit. in n. 23, p. 61 
37 For the case of the Veneto districts in Italy, see the analysis by  M. Contarino, 
“Concertational and Free-Market Paths To Successful Territorial Economic Adjustment: 
Labour Unions and Adjustment in the 1990s”, BJIR, vol. 36, March, 1998, 27-41.  
38 See the analysis of PECs in the UK and Ireland in Sisson and A. Martin Artiles  op. cit. in 
n. 23, p. 61  14                                                BRUNO CARUSO 
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options, ESOPs, investment in professional capabilities, identification with 
management strategies, etc.). 
PECs can thus be considered a response, as far as collective norms are 
concerned, to the general crisis affecting hard law in an era of 
globalisation, that does not only affect statutory labour law as laid down 
by the state but also conventional labour law: that is, the collectively-
negotiated version of the process of deformalisation and soft, flexible 
specialisation of the law. In this way, in conventional labour law, 
partnership agreements like PECs allow standard norms to interact with 
diversification in territorial and internal labour markets, resulting in a 
diversification of conventional regulatory structures at the plant level   
governing employment relationships, along completely new lines. What is 
envisaged is a system of collective negotiation of “opportunities”
39: the 
provision of mechanisms and instruments of co-operation (joint 
commissions etc.) creates a multiplicity of company-level or sectorial co-
operative set-ups that could correspond to a “massive retreat on the part 
of government and public law regimes” and regulation via standard, 
general collective agreements that constitute a prelude to a continuous 
process of future action based on exchange and co-operative 
collaboration
40. 
The real and potential effects of the development of PECs, not only on 
traditional models of collective bargaining but also on highly protective 
labour law systems based on legal and conventional norms that do not 
allow for derogation, are therefore considerable.  
 
4.1 The contents: the diversification of standard labour rules via 
PECs 
As far as the specific contents of PECs are concerned, this type of 
contract leads to a functional diversification of the standard rules, as 
pointed out previously, in relation to the specific requirements of internal 
markets and external constraints. At a sub-sectorial level, in fact, PECs 
often alter the standardising function of higher-level collective 
agreements (that is, at the industry, sector or branch level).  
As has emerged from the European Foundation study
41, these 
agreements do not only adapt contractual norms regarding a certain 
sector or industry to a specific context, but also introduce, albeit within 
                                                 
39 Cf. M.R. Ferrarese, Le istituzioni della globalizzazione, diritto e diritti nella società 
transnazionale”, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000, pp. 57 ff. and 151 ff.  
40 G. Teubner, Diritto policontesturale: prospettive giuridiche della pluralizzazione dei mondi 
sociali, Napoli, La città del sole, 1999, quoted by Ferrarese in n. 39, p. 151 
41 K. Sisson and A. Martin Artiles  “Handling Restructuring ” op. cit. in n. 23, passim. DECENTRALISED SOCIAL PACTS, TRADE UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  15 
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the framework of higher-level norms, a degree of individualisation (and 
flexibility) of the collective terms, above all as regards working hours and 
pay,
42 but also pension plans and profit sharing options
43. The aims are 
different but convergent: greater individual flexibility, adaptation of the 
individual worker to company requirements, an increase in his/her 
productivity but also greater involvement in the productive goals of the 
company.  
The same negotiated rules also introduce a completely new role for 
individual autonomy and contracts: it is as if the collective  provision 
were “committing suicide” to be reborn in the guise of individualised 
regulation
44.  
The effect of PECs on the relationship between collective regulation and 
individual employment relationships also shows that through collective 
agreements it is possible to promote alternative forms of employment 
(temporary contracts, fixed-term contracts, training contracts, - 
‘dependent self-employed’ , i.e. ‘parasubordination’), at times overcoming 
the limits imposed by law (for example, Art. 2094 of the Italian Civil 
Code) . In this case, a collective agreement  increases  the fragmentation 
of work in order to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction (beyond the 
boundaries of standard permanent employment relationships); but by so 
doing it jeopardises its traditional function of establishing and regulating 
a uniform, compact type of standard  employment relationship. 
Still with regard to their contents, PECs rarely but significantly
45 also 
affect the minimum wage function of collective agreements at a national 
or industry-wide level in that, given the rewards in terms of employment 
or other aims (in Italy, for example, the regularisation of the hidden 
economy), they establish salaries that are lower than the minimum levels 
laid down by these agreements or the temporary suspension of already 
                                                 
42 For the phenomenon of the de-collectivisation of pay, cf. J. Filella, J. and A. Hegewisch, 
‘European Experiments With Pay and Benefits Policies’, in C. Brewster and A. Hegewisch 
(eds), Policy and Practice in European Human Resource Management: The Price Waterhouse 
Cranfield Survey, London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 89-106.  In the USA the effects of pay 
differentiation are particularly evident, not least due to the prevalent model of industrial 
relations: cf. P. Cappelli , The New Deal at Work , op. cit. in n. 13, pp. 10 and 148 ff. 
Contrary to the association between new industrial relations and new individual pay 
schemes is W. K. Roche,  “The End of New Industrial Relations?”, op. cit. in n. 19.   
43 For examples of such agreements, see the reports of the European Foundation, Dublin, 
op. cit. in nn. 23 and 24. 
44  On the new dynamics between collective and individual bargaining, cf. R. Huiskamp, 
“Diversity of Employment Relations: Collective Bargaining Regenerates (in the Netherlands), 
but does Industrial Relations Theory?” in T. Wilthagen. (ed.), Advancing theory in labour law 
, op. cit. in n. 32, pp. 143-150. 
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negotiated pay increases, or again diversified adjustments in relation to 
the size of a company, or even pay increases reserved for certain groups 
of workers 
46.  
On the whole, however, PECs do not aim at reducing labour costs by 
acting directly on the basic pay, but rather complementary elements 
(such as overtime and shift indemnities and various other kinds of 
benefits), or other aspects. More common clauses, for example, refer to 
starting wages (lower than standard) for young workers taken on under 
training contracts, where the below-standard pay is only temporary. 
Another widespread feature is a reduction in working hours and 
consequently pay . 
Besides these effects as regards the contents of individual employment 
relationships, all PECs have the collective aim of protecting the right to 
work, normally for insiders and occasionally for outsiders (that is, the 
maintenance of existing employment rather than an increase)
47; and   
thus a recurrent feature is the concertation  of measures aiming at 
strengthening future stability for insiders through the concession of 
greater functional and organisational flexibility and improvement of 
professional skills by investing in training schemes: a sort of privatisation 
of public policy on employability
48.  
There are also provisions for improving the situation of disadvantaged 
groups of outsiders (women, the young, the long-term unemployed and 
ethnic minorities). But it is evident that PECs, by their very nature as 
bilateral agreements and by the basic philosophy supporting them 
(partnership and mediation between job protection and competitiveness), 
can be appreciated more as new strategies for the protection of insiders 
                                                 
46 For an analysis of the abandonment of sector-level contracts in bargaining in Germany, 
due to the withdrawal of the entrepreneur from the employers’ association that originally 
signed the agreement, cf. R. Dombois, “Verso un nuovo modello nel rapporto di lavoro? 
L’erosione di normali rapporti di lavoro e le nuove strategie”, in Il lavoro nei paesi d’Europa; 
un’analisi comparativa”, F. Bianchi and P. Giovannini (eds.), Milano, Angeli, 1999. Also H. 
Kotthoff, “Work councils and economic restructuring Betriebsräte zwischen 
Beteiligungsofferten und gnadenlosem Kostensenkungsdiktat” in IRRA, Developing 
competitiveness and social justice: the interplay between institution and social partners, XI 
World Congress, Bologna, 1998; R. Bispinck, Reinhard „Deregulierung, Differenzierung und 
Dezentralisierung des Flächentarifvertrags. Eine Bestandsaufnahme neuer 
Entwicklungstendenzen der Tarifpolitik“ WSI Mitteilungen, vol. 50, n. 8, 1997 pp. 551-560. 
47 According to the study carried out by the European Foundation, Dublin, op. cit. in nn. 23 
and 24, an increase in employment was achieved via a reduction in the working week in 
France, while in Spain agreements containing clauses to stabilise temporary jobs are more 
frequent.   
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than as experiments in social policies to safeguard weak interests located 
outside the boundaries of an enterprise. 
It is, however, a fact that PECs represent a new trend towards collective 
relations that also support new individual relations in which the element 
of trust and mutual reliance (between management, trade unions and 
workers, with public authorities acting as monitors) takes on a central 
role. Along lines that are completely different from previous employment 
relationship models where the exchange was based on job stability and 
slow but steady progress in pay and career within an enterprise.  
This new central position taken by trust and mutual reliance as a basis for 
negotiation causes an implicit rewriting of the psychological pact 
underlying an employment contract, whether it be collective or individual; 
the reciprocal expectations do not focus on assets, compensation and 
individual performance that will remain certain and stable, as well as 
quantitatively measurable, across time, so much as a common negotiated 
programme focusing on the ways and instruments considered to be 
necessary for the achievement of shared objectives (for example, new 
rules to make employment flexible as a function of competitiveness); 
while the exchange of mutual and bilateral obligations only remains in the 
background.   
In this way collective and individual agreements take on a new 
organisational dimension; their economic and social function, as opposed 
to the exchange of material benefits or assets, can be seen as a new 
psychological pact based on trust, collaboration and mutual reliance in 
terms of the willingness to accept new rules and procedures for the 
organisation of production and work, with a view to achieving a high level 
of competitiveness and job security 
49. 
This new trust-based organisational dimension of negotiated exchange 
also affects the instruments of traditional collective bargaining. One 
example is the right to information. The information rights that 
corroborate and support the new pacts take on a different function in 
which great importance is attached to the psychological perception of the 
mutual reliance involved, with management forgoing unilateral decisions 
to reduce personnel and workers and their representatives forgoing 
conflictual claims and hostile attitudes towards the entrepreneurial 
requirements of flexibility and competitiveness. 
                                                 
49 On the crisis and psychological and organisational transformation of the so-called 
relational contract, see K.V.V. Stone, “Employment Regulation in a Boundaryless 
Workplace”, op. cit. in n. 3 ; S. Deakin, “The Many Futures of the Contract of Employment”, 
paper presented at V Intell Conference, Toronto, September 2000  18                                                BRUNO CARUSO 
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The development of these information rights (traditionally considered to 
be instrumental to the basic rights connected with distributive 
bargaining), must not be seen against the traditional logic of an increase 
in trade union (or work council) control over the sources of information 
that are at the heart of the power and authority of an enterprise; it is not 
a step towards industrial democracy, but much more prosaically and 
functionally, its spread is connected with the objective need to circulate 
any information that is useful for the involvement of the receivers, with a 
view to increasing competitiveness and improving performance . 
What changes is the psychological and functional approach to the 
exercise of the right to information. As the information involved is 
connected with a shared programme , in which the active involvement of 
both the individual workers and their collective representatives is 
fundamental, the flow of information and communications ceases to be 
passive and top-down (as a duty for the employer ) and is transformed 
into a shared, reactive circuit (the right not only to receive information 
but also to require, seek and exchange information with the aim of 
greater involvement and in reference to common organisational plans)
50. 
Evocatively defined as an ”obsession with communication” 
51, it refers to 
information seen as a strategic political resource for co-operative 
relations.  
Some scholars have understandably raised the problem of how to 
stabilise and institutionalise this right to communication, not least with 
reference to the role of work councils, in relation to the complex question 
of the if and how of legislative intervention in support of this practice of 
mutual reliance 
52 
The question is a delicate one and the few precedents of legislative 
institutionalisation of workers’ rights of expression (the Auroux laws in 
France) have not given particularly significant results. A much more 
interesting experience, according to some observers, not least due to the 
soft (as opposed to hard) regulatory model it proposes, is the application 
in various national contexts of the directive regarding EWCs 
53. 
                                                 
50 In a traditionally “adversarial” persepctive, cf. F. Scarpelli “Diritti di Informazione 
individuali e Collettivi: l’incidenza sulla configurazione del contratto di lavoro”, RGL,  n.2, 
2000, pp. 271-287. 
51 H. Knudsen, Employee Participation in Europe, London, Sage, 1995, quoted by M. 
Martìnez Lucio and S. Weston, “European Works Councils and ‘Flexible Regulation’: The 
Politics of Intervention” EJIR, v. 6, n. 2, 2000, p. 209. 
52  H. Collins “ Regulating…”, op. cit. in n. 3, p. 10. 
53 M. Martìnez Lucio and S. Weston, “European Work Councils and ‘Flexible Regulation’, op. 
c i t .  a  n .  5 2 ;  W .  S t r e e c k  “ I n d ustrial citizenship under regime competition: the case of DECENTRALISED SOCIAL PACTS, TRADE UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  19 
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The new regulation models being discussed are located on a difficult, 
narrow ridge between purportedly collaborative relations, in which 
behavioural dynamics are left as far as possible to mutual reliance and 
spontaneous, informal initiatives by both parties, with a necessarily high 
degree of flexibility and constant adaptability; and normative measures 
which, although envisaged to strengthen and support the model, may, 
especially if endowed with sanctionary mechanisms, have the counter-
effect of making the behaviour more rigid, misrepresenting its aims 
and/or making it ineffective due to the well-known trap of regulatory 
trilemma: an incongruence of law and society with law becoming 
ineffective; an over-legalisation of society, that is, the juridification of 




4.2 Transformation of the function of the law: from supporting to 
orienting collective bargaining 
It is of interest to point out that the specific contents of some PECs, for 
example in France (agreements on flexible working time accompanied by 
a reduction in hours and an increase in jobs) and agreements for the 
stabilisation of  temporary and fixed-term employment in Spain, were to 
some extent determined by legislative trends or national social pacts that 
aimed at promoting and selecting specific social objectives, using 
decentralised collective bargaining (an increase in employment and a 
reduction in temporary jobs by turning them into permanent 
employment); the consensus resources of the bargaining  method, and 
the diffusive and differentiating capacity of peripheral and territorial 
bargaining have been  made functional in these cases to objectives 
previously determined by the centre, that is, by legislators (France) or 
social partners  (Spain)
55.  
                                                                                                                              
European work councils, JEPP, v. 4, n.4, 1997, pp. 643-664. For detailed empirical analyses 
of how EWCs work, cf. the European Work Councils Bulletin. 
54 G. Teubner, “After Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic Model of Post-Regulatory Law” in G. 
Teubner, Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1986, p. 311. It would 
seem that the proposal by Collins falls into the same trap, see Collins, “Regulating…”cit. in 
n. 3, on the model of default rules relating to workers’ representation institutions and 
sanctions against employers who do not obey them, p. 17 typescript. 
55  For an analysis of these agreements see the reports of the European Foundation, Dublin, 
cit. in n. 23, and also S. Jefferys, “A ‘Copernican Revolution’ in French Industrial Relations: 
Are The Times  Changing?” BJIR, vol. 38, 2, 2000, pp. 241-260.  P.  Auvergnon, “Work-time 
Reduction in France: the Role of Collective Bargaining in Implementing the Law”,  IJCLLIR, 
Vol. 16, n. 3, 2000, p. 201 ss; P.H. Antonmattei, “Le temps dans la négociation 35 heures”, 
in DS , n. 3, 2000, p. 305 ff. On the contents of Spanish social pacts, see M.  R. Alarcon 
Caracuel, “ Cuatro lustros de derecho del trabajo en España: entre la consagración del 20                                                BRUNO CARUSO 
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The novelty here does not lie in the  support that legislative  provisions or 
negotiated clauses in centralised pacts have handed over to decentralised 
collective bargaining
56, but rather in the guiding function of legal sources 
and central pacts, above all by the selective granting of financial 
incentives, towards predetermined, binding objectives of adaptability, 
flexibility and protection (the correcting function of the statute law or 
centralised pact, as mentioned previously). 
Here again we have confirmation of the trend towards the organised 
decentralisation of collective bargaining, as well as  functionalisation of 
contractual methods to objectives predetermined by central governments 
(or autonomous communities in federal systems)
57, extending almost 




5. Are the main partners in PECs new? 
Pacts for employment and competitiveness at the enterprise level do not 
present any significant innovations as far as the actors involved are 
concerned. As pointed out previously, public actors play a key role, but 
not a particularly visible one, rather like ghosts at the bargaining table: 
so their part is basically external and “discreet” (more one of orientation 
than active direction and/or intervention). It is this position on the 
sidelines, where public actors are never formal subscribers to the 
agreements, that distinguishes PECs from Territorial Employment Pacts, 
which will be discussed infra.  
Management, on the other hand, takes on an unusually prominent role, a 
proactive  attitude, in relation to the decentralisation of decisional powers 
resulting from modifications in the organisational and managerial set-ups 
and the dissemination of responsibilities connected with the competitive 
results of the various production units into which enterprises are 
structured. 
                                                                                                                              
Estado Social y el efecto de las crisis económicas”, in El trabajo ante el cambio de siglo: un 
tratamiento multidisciplinar, Marcial Pons, Madrid - Barcelona, 2000, especially p. 26 ff.  A. 
Montoya Melgar, “Estabilidad en el empleo y nuevas propuestas de fomento de la 
contratacion indefinita”, DL, 1999, especially p. 22 ff.  
56  This has been a recurrent phenomenon in Italy since the ’80s. 
57 See, for example, the case of Catalonia, A. Lopez, “ Il pacte per a l’ocupaciò a Catalunya 
1998-2000: verso una strategia locale per l’occupazione?, DRI, n. 4/X, 2000, pp. 501-506. 
58  G. Falkner, “European Works Councils and the Maastricht Agreement: Towards a New 
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The role and composition of workers’ representations appears quite clear: 
according to the European Foundation research, workers’ organisations in 
PECs follow the internal traditions of the single national systems
59 . 
It is, however, undeniable that there is a certain amount of latent tension 
that can in a sense be considered structural.  In PECs, in fact, the 
dialectical “us and them” typical of traditional collective bargaining tends 
to feature new subjects: the management and workers of single 
production units versus the high-level management of a big company or 
the managers, workers and representatives of other production units, 
perhaps located beyond the national boundaries.  PECs are therefore the 
result of co-operative relations regarding interests (employment and 
competitiveness) that are assumed to be shared by management, trade 
unions and workers in local production units, through a method that 
involves participation rather than bargaining. Hence, from both the 
theoretical and practical viewpoint more space is given in industrial 
relations to joint committees, as a direct expression of inner interests, 
than to traditional trade unions, which are agents above all at an 
industry- wide or sectorial level and traditional defenders of broader 
community interests
60. This scenario could also revitalise the double 
channel model of representation through trade unions and the workers’ 
direct representatives . 
This revaluation of the specific, irreplaceable, renewed function of work 
councils in industrial relations in the era of the ‘knowledge-driven 
economy’
61 has been criticised as regards the ineffectiveness and 
precarious nature of models of workers’ representation that do not 
contemplate the strong, deep-rooted presence of trade union 
organisations
62.  
These criticisms apart, the problem remains of whether traditional forms 
of trade union representation (even in systems featuring a double 
channel, but with trade union control of workers’ organisations) are the 
most suitable to handle the new participatory relations within an 
enterprise. 
It is certainly true that, as the experience of German work councils 
shows, it is often not an easy task to trace the dividing line between 
bargaining and participation, because reality frequently presents hybrids 
                                                 
59 K. Sisson and A. Martin Artiles  “Handling Restructuring ” op. cit. in n. 23, p. 51 
60 H. Collins, “ Flexibility and Empowerment”, cit. in n. 32. 
61 H. Collins cit. in n. 3. 
62 M. Terry, “System of collective employees representation in non-union firms in the UK”, 
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of the two methods
63; it should, however, be recognised that bodies for 
the direct representation of workers are more suitable structures for co-
operative participatory relations. 
This is even more true in plant-level partnership practices where 
participation is not the result of trade union demands for involvement in 
management prerogatives, with the consequent control or limitation of 
these prerogatives, but, on the contrary, of a management initiative in 
order to obtain from the workers and their organisations consensual 
legitimisation of their strategies of flexibility and competition which would 
otherwise be conducted unilaterally.  
It is also true, as shown by experience in the industrial districts in Italy 
and in German work councils, that a trade union inspired by strong 
participatory ideals, willing to be involved in partnership initiatives, can 
support or directly manage partnership relationships, taking on the role 
which in other contexts is peculiar to work councils. 
The fact remains that changes in the contents of partnership agreements 
connected with the new models of individual worker involvement (not 
only in quality-oriented labour reorganisation processes but also in the 
very objectives of the enterprise), lead to a chain of adaptive 
modifications in the system of relations within a company: as was to be 
expected, the adaptation of the bargaining method on a co-operative 
basis determines a need to redefine the mechanisms and agents for 
workers’ representation, to find an alternative to the adversarial approach 
of trade union representation.  
Partnership relations in the new economy will probably lead to an 
objective need to define new types of representation (or re-orient the old 
ones) , in such a way that they can combine the need to broaden the 
channels of co-operative communication between workers and 
management, and also deal with problems of technical, organisational 
and financial management ( for example pension funds). 
It cannot be excluded that the evolution of PECs will produce a 
diversification of the representation institutions beyond classical monistic 
or dualistic schemes: a proliferation of types of representation whose 
diversity of tasks and functions as compared with traditional distributive 
bargaining corresponds to a structural diversification, and thus a change 
in its legitimisation criteria (not necessarily all elective and democratic 
but also based on expertise).  
                                                 
63 G. Strauss “Collective Bargaining, Unions, and Participation”, in Organizational 
participation myth and reality, F. Heller, E. Pusic, G. Strauss and B. Wilpert, Oxford, OUP, 
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A diversification of strategies of industrial relations (from distributive 
bargaining to flexibility and employment through social partnership) thus 
poses the problem of governing the process of diversification/adaptation 
of patterns of workers’ representation, also via  supporting legislation .  
It is no coincidence that although Community legislation concerning 
health and safety referred to national practice, it intended to promote 
specific, differentiated workers’ representatives whose raison d’etre lay in 
their expertise, criteria of technical legitimisation and involvement in 
management. Community legislators, that is, were sending out a signal 
that was not always received by national legislators and trade unions : a 
diversification of models of representation in both a structural and a 
functional sense. 
  
6. Territorial Employment Pacts vs. Pacts for 
Employment and Competitiveness: how they differ 
The concept of trilateral partnership has a more prominent role in 
Territorial Employment Pacts (TEPs)
64 than in PECs. From a formal 
viewpoint, the main feature of TEPs is the direct involvement of various 
public actors (local  authorities, chambers of commerce, banks, research 
institutes, universities, professional associations, third sector 
associations, etc.)
65. In TEPs, in fact, public authorities directly accept 
certain commitments, often in a solemn, written form. These 
commitments concern not only the granting of financial resources but 
also forward-looking planning (e.g. investments in infrastructures, 
providing services for enterprises, administrative efficiency, public order 
measures, etc.). Given the agreement on times and methods, the 
commitments of the various partners assume the form typical of a private 
negotial exchange.  
This evidently makes TEPs more institutionalised than PECs, pointing to a 
logic based on trilateral concerted participation that is closer to the 
                                                 
64 In this essay the reference to Territorial Employment Pact is not of a technical and formal 
nature, as in the Italian system, where  territorial pacts respond to a regulatory logic 
governing local social and economic planning through precise legal provisions. For a social 
analysis of the Italian experience of TEPs, see A. Bonomi – G. De Rita, Manifesto per lo 
sviluppo locale: dall’azione di comunità ai Patti territoriali, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1998; 
for a legal analysis, cf. G.P. Manzella “Patti Territoriali: vicende di un istituto di 
programmazione negoziata”, RGM, n. 3, 1997, pp. 789-844; M. Zoccatelli,”I patti territoriali 
e i contratti d’area: genesi, realizzazioni e questioni irrisolte”, Le istituzioni del federalismo, 
n. 1-2, 1998, pp. 261-283. For the Community policy guidelines for TEPs in acting locally for 
employment, cf. O. Quentin “The Role of Local and Regional Authorities in the draft 
Employment Guidelines”, Dublin Castle, Ireland, October, 2000. 
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models of national social pacts. In Italy, for example, the introduction of 
three kinds of territorial pacts – Territorial pacts in the technical sense, 
Contratti d’area and Contratti di Programma , has coincided with the 
policy favoured by central government  and the numerous actors taking 
part in the national social pact (Christmas Pact dated 23
rd December, 98) 
to give full institutional legitimacy to local concertation, so as to involve 
decentralised institutional actors in the bottom-up planning of economic 
development, thus going far beyond the limits of labour and industrial 
relations policy in a strict sense. 
Given this function, in a technical sense territorial pacts have taken on an 
institutional significance at a European level as well (albeit with the 
limited purpose of funding initial handling of the pacts – the 
Commission’s so-called “accompanying strategy”). In a more general 
sense, European Community employment policies and the planned 
management of social funding (Agenda 2000) seem to have been inspired 
by the idea of actively promoting local partnership through territorial 
pacts in a technical sense and other forms of partnership. 
The relevant literature has widely demonstrated that global competition 
and the increased territorial mobility of enterprise, which is one of its 
effects, make territorial resources a strategic issue: competition arises 
not only between companies but also between territories, in relation to 
the material and immaterial competitive advantages that external 
economies can offer companies (infrastructures, services, social 
networks, trust, skills and tacit knowledge
66).  
As Carlo Trigilia states, this leads to a sort of paradox: globalisation 
increases the territorial mobility of enterprises but at the same time it 
increases the potential influence of the territorial dimension on local 
development processes
67.   
In a broad sense, then, territorial pacts involve a wide range of policies 
and significant public interests, from territorial government (not only 
urban and environmental planning but also public order and safety 
                                                 
66 On the notion of social capital, see C. Trigilia “Capitale sociale e sviluppo locale”, S&M, n. 
57, 1999, pp. 419-440. In general on the new economic relevance of the territory in the 
context of global competition, see P. Perulli (ed.) Neoregionalismo, l’economia arcipelago, 
Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1998; J. L. Laville – L. Gardin, Le iniziative locali in Europa, 
Torino, Bollati Boringhieri 1999; A. Magnaghi, Il progetto locale, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 
2000. 
67 “The development of a territory depends more on the capacity of local actors (individual 
and collective, public and private) to co-operate in increasing external economies and thus 
in building up solid local benefits for companies (i.e. not merely cost benefits)”: C. Trigilia 
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issues
68) to industrial policy. They are one of the most significant 
examples of the process of explicit (as opposed to informal or hidden)  
”contractualisation” of public policies
69. This process was a feature of 
changes in territorial governance that occurred in the ‘90s  in a context of 
decentralised planning and concertation,  giving rise to a new season of 
neo-institutionalism (new rules within institutions, and between 
institutions, society and the enterprise system)
70. 
In their vision of global territorial governance, however, territorial pacts 
also involve labour market policies and, thanks to a particular capacity for 
penetration, have insinuated themselves into companies’ internal labour 
markets (affecting company systems of industrial relations and personnel 
management), even reaching the threshold of territorial welfare policies, 
which were traditionally the preserve of the state and local authorities 
(the creation of innovative welfare and reception services, family support, 
the protection of weak social groups such as the elderly, the disabled, the 
underprivileged, immigrants, minors, etc.), and proposing policies to 
support the social economy (co-operation, non-profit organisations, 
voluntary work)
71. Territorial social pacts, that is, have also been used to 
implement new policies for inclusion in social citizenship
72. 
As a general remark, it is worthwhile pointing out that the salient feature 
of territorial pacts is not the bilateral bargaining typical of private 
contracts in public administration (where the principal/agent relationship 
prevails), but rather the natural plurality of the actors involved in 
negotiations; however, the fragmentation of the parties involved is 
balanced by the pursuit of a shared aim, which leads to co-operation, 
                                                 
68 R. Selmini “Sicurezza urbana e prevenzione della criminalità: il caso italiano”, Polis, v. 
13., n. 1, 1999, pp. 121-141. 
69 L. Bobbio “Produzione di politiche a mezzo di contratti nella pubblica amministrazione” 
S&M, n. 58, 2000, p. 13.   
70 C. Carbon “Concertare e programmare in ambito regionale. Il caso delle Marche”, 
Lavori.QRS, v. 1, n.3, 2000, pp. 62-63. 
71 For an initial conceptualisation of the varied contents of Territorial Pacts in Italy, see A. 
Viscomi, “Mercato regole diritti” paper presented at the Conference on “Employment and 
Competitiveness: what are the labour rules?” Benevento 16 June 2000. 
72 Cf. the disputed Milan Territorial Pact for employment in B. Caruso “Immigration Policies 
in Southern Europe: More State, Less Market?”, in J. Conaghan, R. M. Fishl, K. Klare (ed.) 
Labour Law in the Era of Transformation, Oxford, OUP, forthcoming. M. Biagi, “Il patto 
Milano Lavoro: un’intesa pilota”, DRI, n. 2, 2000, pp. 127-134; T. Treu “Il patto sul lavoro 
di Milano: un modello di concertazione in stile europeo”, DRI,  n. 2, 2000, pp. 123-126; M. 
Tiraboschi “Le politiche per l’occupazione tra crisi della contrattazione collettiva nazionale e 
spinte federalistiche”, D&PL,  n. 10, 2000,  pp. 741-744; M. Bolocan Goldstein “La via 
milanese alla concertazione. Il patto per il lavoro” Lavori.QRS, v. 1, n.3, 2000, pp. 91-105. 
F. Scalpelli “Il patto Milano lavoro: le ragioni di un dissenso”, DRI, n. 2, 2000, 135-140. 26                                                BRUNO CARUSO 
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originally voluntary but subsequently forced (not least due to the political 
responsibility pursuant to an agreement that has been publicly 
announced but not reached, or even legal responsibility – for example, 
the loss of planned funding in certain cases)
73. 
It is, however, clear that the complexity of the circular bargaining 
relationships inherent in this kind of contractual co-operation inevitably 
causes an increase in the transaction costs of implementing public 
policies, and possibly slows down or even blocks decision-making 
processes. But it is also evident that the “contractualisation” of public 
policy represents something in between state and market. It is a way to 
solve public problems without recourse to the authority of the statute 
law, or through mere market mechanisms, but rather by conscious 
adjustment of the interests of the parties involved and the search for 
consensus regarding common objectives and instruments”
74.  
    The following sections will outline the two functions that have the 
greatest impact on the labour law regulation system: the effects on 
governance of the labour market at a territorial level and on systems of 
contractual relations at the company level, with their repercussions on 
employment relationships and the relative de-standardisation processes. 
We will not deal with the aims of territorial and social governance, or the 
broader economic, industrial, development or welfare policies the pacts 
intend to pursue.  
More specifically, the attention will be focused on the ways in which 
territorial bargaining has innovated existing models of industrial relations 
(especially in Italy), and the ways in which territorial agreements have 
been grafted onto traditional bargaining of the vertical type (at a 
company or industry level) typical of the Fordist era, producing 
problematic forms of interaction with conventional models of industrial or 
professional trade union representation. 
 
7. Territorial pacts and internal/external labour 
market policies 
Territorial employment pacts differ from PECs not only in that they 
directly involve public actors in local agreements and have a more 
evident institutional significance, but also because they tend to affect a 
wide range of public policies, including the management and fluidification 
of local labour markets. The contents of territorial pacts, as regards both 
the planned and  the immediate regulatory measures, make them tools 
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for diversification of the standard rules governing labour law not only at a 
company level but at a territorial one as well. 
Territorial employment pacts therefore respond to two requirements that 
need to be clearly stated:  
a) Functionally, social pacts have the task of adapting and modulating, at 
a micro (territorial) level, the at times excessively rigid macro policies of 
centralised social pacts, which often seem unable, without further 
intervention, to extend the advantages of bargaining at a macro level 
(pay agreements, a low rate of inflation and safeguarding of the welfare 
system) to certain excluded and marginalised social groups. Centralised 
social pacts, that is, appear to be incapable of coping with territorial and 
social inequalities and differences in development and unemployment 
rates
75. 
b)  Structurally,  territorial pacts propose the involvement of social 
partners in the institutional government of the labour market, fully 
exploiting the resources of the contractual method, but at a territorial 
rather than company level (as in the case of PECs). Through territorial 
social pacts the collective bargaining method, with its resources of 
consensus and flexibility, leaves the confines of the single company and 
is extended to the territory. It is as if collective bargaining had reinvented 
itself to become a practice of territorial labour policy concertation, thus 
not only enlarging its traditional jurisdiction (even dealing with active 
labour policies) but also conquering new spheres of institutional 
legitimacy.  
  It should be pointed out, however, that the involvement of social 
partners in the concerted management of the labour market is not a 
totally unknown institutional practice. The 70s and 80s in Italy, for 
example, experienced widespread trade union participation in a myriad of 
tripartite institutions bureaucratically and administratively responsible for 
management of the labour market (the so-called “amministrazione per 
collegi”): from a public national employment service to regional 
employment commissions and agencies
76. 
The difference between this institutional model and Territorial Pacts is 
that the social partners were previously involved within the public sphere 
working according to the legal framework of administrative law. With 
Territorial Pacts, on the contrary, institutional involvement in the handling 
of public labour policies lies outside the administrative bodies, and follows 
a logic typical of private law and bargaining, the sinuosity and flexibility 
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of which are capable of adapting tools and policies to different local 
contexts.  
In practice, territorial pacts differ according to the level of economic, 
social and institutional development of the area they refer to.  
   The local level, which TEPs privilege, inevitably extends the object of 
negotiated exchange to the labour market and employment relationships, 
thus making the dynamics of the exchange more complex than they are 
in PECs. The aims of greater flexibility in handling employment 
relationships (derogation from limitations on the use of atypical 
employment contracts, flexible pay and working hours, etc.) and a 
reduction in labour costs
77 are becoming more acceptable to trade union 
organisations because they enable them to obtain a better deal, not only 
safeguarding insider employment, as in PECs, but also strengthening the 
potential for economic development and thus job opportunities, above all 
for outsiders, in the territory involved.  
The contents of agreements negotiated via TEPs, in fact, largely reflect 
the four pillars of European Community employment policy: besides 
investments in infrastructures, the strengthening of mechanisms to 
support employability and entrepreneurship, (policies and resources for 
in-service and external training, the monitoring of local labour markets, 
the introduction and development of employment agencies, the provision 
of territorial funds for workers temporarily unemployed in certain sectors, 
the provision of advanced services to enterprise, simplification of 
administrative procedures, tax incentives for the creation of permanent 
jobs, measures against the hidden economy, etc.); and also flexibility in 
the handling of employment relationships (adaptability) and equal 
opportunities. 
Of particular significance in this respect is the evolution of territorial 
bargaining in the so-called economy of “districts” in Italy
78, which often 
correspond to sectors traditionally featuring small firms or craftsmen 
(textiles, furniture, building, tourism)
79. In these sectors and territories 
(which have given rise to specific regional and sub-regional models: the 
                                                 
77 On the results for employment of the so-called “zones franches urbaines” in France, see 
G. Cahin, “Le zones franches urbaines, AJDA, v. 65, n. 6, 1999, pp. 467-477; E . Larpin, Le 
zones franches n’ont pas fait de miracle pour l’emploi, Liason sociale Mensuel, n.1, 1999, 
40-42. 
78 Here again the relevant literature is vast:  G. Becattini, Dal distretto industriale allo 
sviluppo locale, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2000.  
79 M. Giaccone, “Contrattazione territoriale come infrastruttura dello sviluppo locale” 
Lavori.QRS, v. 1, n.3, 2000, pp. 13-45; L. Bellardi – L. Bordogna, Relazioni industriali e 
contrattazione aziendale: continuità e riforma nell’esperienza italiana recente, Milano, 
Angeli, 1997. DECENTRALISED SOCIAL PACTS, TRADE UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  29 
 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona"  2/2002 
Emilia Romagna model, the Veneto model, the Prato model in Tuscany, 
etc.), collective bargaining has followed the same strategy as PECs: 
bilateral partnership but at a territorial rather than industry or plant level, 
to support the competitiveness of micro firms by injecting a heavy dose 
of flexibility (as regards working hours, wages and geographical location) 
into both the internal and external labour market. These measures are 
almost always accompanied by others supporting income levels if not 
permanent employment security
80.  
This type of bilateral bargaining at a territorial level, which has followed 
cyclic trends, does not differ from PECs as regards its functions and 
structure (here again based on partnership) so much as the territorial, as 
opposed to plant-level, significance of its sphere of operations. It is a sort 
of territorial PEC that still enjoys great favour, as is demonstrated by the 
recent national agreement relating to the trade sector in Italy
81. Due to 
its features as a bilateral territorial partnership (a subspecies of a PEC) 
this model of negotiated partnership does not come under the broad 
notion of a TEP as the public actor is absent from the formal exchange. 
Since the mid 90s, however, there has been a trend towards transforming the 
PECs of territorial districts into actual forms of territorial concertation 
(TEPs). This has occurred above all in areas where traditional bilateral 
territorial bargaining had reached a crisis. In order to broaden the 
contractual contents of this model of territorial bargaining, bilateral 
district bargaining has been transformed into multilateral territorial 
bargaining. The legal institutional sign of this transformation has been 
given by the leading role taken in the negotiated agreements by public 
actors (above all local authorities)
82.  
Intervention by public actors has not been confined to mediation but has 
aimed at building up a framework of general mutual convenience that 
would promote trade union concessions regarding flexibility and labour 
                                                 
80 Supplementary welfare measures on a voluntary or contributive basis via the institution 
of bilateral management organisms that have in time transformed from instruments for the 
administration of collective bargaining into proper institutions in charge of regulating the 
local labour market. 
81 In the trade sector, although this type of territorial partnership is strongly supported at a 
national level, it has become a widespread tool for the introduction of massive doses of 
flexibility at a company level (longer opening hours, job sharing, weekend jobs, atypical 
forms of employment, post maternity-leave part-time jobs, an increase in the legitimacy of 
fixed-term contracts, allowances for temporary and apprenticeship contracts, etc. ), see G. 
Ludovico 2000, “Il rilancio della bilateralità, la flessibilità e il decentramento nel rinnovo 
contrattuale del commercio”, DRI, n. 2, 2000, pp. 269-275. 
82 For example, the 1997 “Territorial Pact for Development and Employment in the Province 
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costs: investments in infrastructures, tax incentives, the provision of 
services to enterprises. Beyond the specific example of the evolution of 
territorial bargaining in Italian districts, the new dynamic of territorial 
pacts has also affected urban and metropolitan areas with varying 
degrees of social and economic development in various national contexts. 
In the more developed urban areas
83, the primary intent of TEPs is to 
reduce exclusion and social discrimination through measures aimed to 
promote the employment of immigrants and the long-term unemployed, 
to re-insert former convicts and prostitutes, and to reduce juvenile 
employment). In economically underdeveloped or declining urban areas, 
on the other hand, the TEPs have tended to promote employment in 
general, especially for young people
84.  
If, however, one were to make an internal typological differentiation 
between TEPs, it would not concern the identification of categories of 
previously excluded workers to be re-inserted into the labour market so 
much as the varying degrees of specificity of the measures aiming at 
flexibility in standard work relationships offered in return for institutional 
commitment to intervene proactively in the labour market. This is 
therefore a differentiation concerning their regulatory structure and the 
extent to which their clauses and commitments are legally binding. 
  Several TEPs, for example, contain policy provisions, at times not 
particularly innovative ones, that refer to existing regulatory frameworks 
or at most try to rationalise them. (These provisions therefore require a 
further plant-level bargaining stage and can be considered as a sort of 
framework Territorial Pact viz. the recent Catania Territorial Pact)
85. 
Although other Pacts largely contain provisions that entail complex 
management, monitoring and subsequent implementation, they do, 
however, aim to introduce employment relationship flexibility that is 
already directly applicable; measures that firms operating in the territory 
                                                 
83 Besides the Milan Pact cit. in n. 72, we can also mention the pact for the metropolitan 
area of Vienna, “Social partners cooperate to improve Vienna’s labour market” Eironline, 
June 1999; the Brussels Territorial Pact, “Brussels-Capital Territorial Employment Pact 
examined,  Eironline,  May, 2000. On the effects for employment of Territorial Pacts, see 
“Territorial employment pacts boast 55,000 new jobs”, ESP, n. 101, 1999, p. 10  
84  For example, the Territorial Pact for Zeitz, a town in the former DDR, “Territorial 
employment pacts in Germany, the example of Zeitz” Eiroline, July 1998, or the Ferrara 
Territorial Pact, in M. Biagi “Il contratto di prima esperienza nel patto territoriale di Ferrara”, 
Guida al lavoro Il sole 24 ore, n. 31, 2000, pp. 19-22. P. L. Also, Minicucci “I ‘contratti di 
prima esperienza’: un nuovo strumento di flessibilità contrattata”, Lavori.QRS, v. 1, n. 3, 
2000, p. 199-203. 
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8. Effects of the spread of Territorial Employment 
Pacts  
a) the crisis of the national agreement as the mainstay of the 
collective bargaining system 
For some time now, centralised bargaining systems in Europe have been 
put under great pressure due to the process of decentralisation. This 
pressure is due above all to management initiatives relating to company 
reorganisation . The decentralisation of bargaining systems is therefore 
largely determined by an endogenous drive towards reorganisation of 
companies’ production processes and financial administration. 
The most attentive observers have, however, noticed that TEPs may well 
signal a decentralisation trend featuring factors that are exogenous to the 
contractual system, of an institutional nature: TEPs, that is, would seem 
to confirm the irresistible rise of federalism in Europe, extending its 
influence from the structure of the state to  that most classical of social 
systems – collective bargaining
87 – and impacting greatly upon it. 
This judgement is probably not supported by clear empirical evidence. 
The fact remains, however, that throughout a large part of Europe the 
collective industry-wide or plant-level agreement, the cornerstone of 
trade union relations in the Fordist organisation, is going through a period 
of crisis
88.  
Following this line of thought, both the upward thrust, at a European 
level
89, and the downward thrust, of which TEPs are but one example, 
would seem to question the central role of national agreements, even in 
their last remaining strongholds (e.g. Italy).  
It seems, however, methodologically incorrect to posit a mechanical 
causal connection between federalistic modifications of the institutional 
framework and transformations in the structure of collective bargaining, 
whereby a certain legal input due to accentuation of institutional legal 
                                                 
86 For the Locri area, Manfredonia and Crotone Pacts, for example, see the overview by A. 
Viscomi “Flessibilità contrattuale in quattro contratti d’area”, DML, v. 1, n.2, pp. 381-392. 
87 T. Treu, “Il patto sul lavoro di Milano”, op. cit. in n. 72, pp. 123-124. 
88 A. Ferner & R. Hyman (eds.), Changing Industrial Relations in Europe, op. cit. in n. 24. 
89 P. Margisson and K. Sisson, “European Collective Bargaining”, cit. in n. 11; B. Keller B. 
Sörries “Sectorial social dialogues : new opportunities or more impasses ?”IRJ, v. 30, n. 4, 
pp.330-344. A. Martin “Wage Bargaining under Emu: Europeanization, Re-Nationalization or 
Americanisation?” WP Centre for European Studies, Harvard University, April, 1999, pp. 3-
36. P. Pochet, “Renegotiating the Social Contract in the Shadow of EMU: Decentralisation, 
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federalism would correspond to a certain social output (linear adaptation 
of the bargaining structure, for example, with a shift from industry-level 
national agreements to regional agreements following institutional reform 
inspired by the principles of constitutional regionalism).  
The interference between the new federalism-oriented legal systems and 
social systems (the structure of collective bargaining) is probably more 
complex and subtle than would be suggested by a vertical, linear logic 
that sees legal input as directly affecting social systems
90. 
It is, however, undeniable that the more the powers of central state 
authority are delegated to peripheral territorial authorities, with reference 
to institutional responsibilities that directly or indirectly affect and 
differentiate between labour costs, and the labour market (tax and public 
service charges policy, welfare
91, income protection, flexibility), the 
weaker the collective national contract’s regulatory, standardising and 
egalitarian capacity becomes. 
The risk of an ideological, “symbolic” defence of the national collective 
agreement, as seems to prevail in certain areas of Italian trade unionism, 
is to progressively weaken its regulatory capacity and sphere of 
application. It is thus the risk of a slow, not officially declared, death 
(that is, not by abandonment, but by progressive replacement with tools 
of differentiation and de-standardisation such as PECs and TEPs and the 
consequent disappearance of its topical function – the regulation of 
standard or minimum pay)
92 . 
The alternative to this slow disintegration of the regulatory capacity of 
national agreements is strong legislative support for centralised 
bargaining (as has happened in France with dubious results, or in Italy 
with specific, rather than general, state intervention)
93.  
It would, however, be a paradox if trade unions like the Italian ones, for 
whom voluntarism in industrial relations and legislative abstentionism are 
a sort of cultural identity, should need to have recourse to the statute law 
                                                 
90 B. Caruso, “Strutture contrattuali e riforme federaliste: si condizionano reciprocamente?” 
forthcoming in LD. 
91 G. Balandi “Lavoro e diritto alla protezione sociale”, LD, v. 13, n.1, pp. 125-149. 
92 The risk is that of making collective bargaining ineffective, as happened in Germany, 
where the trade unions were recently forced to authorise derogation of national agreements 
at plant level: see the authors cit. in n. 46. 
93  As has happened recently in Italy regarding part-time jobs. The legal provisions that 
prevented decentralised bargaining from disregarding the clauses of national agreements as 
regards supplementary work were subsequently repealed: see A. Lo Faro, “Occupazione 
‘adattabile’ e autonomia negoziale privata nella riforma del part-time,” forthcoming in 
GDLRI. The legal norm whereby national collective contracts cannot be derogated by the so-
called contratti d’area is, however, still in force: Art. 203, statute of 23
rd December 1996, n. 
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to re-affirm the central and irreplaceable standardisation function of 
collective agreements.  
Moreover, by virtue of their very structure and function, national sector 
agreements are closely connected with the Fordist industrial production 
cycle; at their most elastic and flexible, they may cover company-level 
welfare problems and the internal labour market, besides setting labour 
costs and stabilising power relationships between the two countervailing 
parts: their canonical function is still regulation of the basic elements of 
standard permanent employment – pay, hours and job evaluation 
systems.  
National collective agreements, however, do not have the capacity to deal 
with new issues such as social exclusion within the “external” labour 
market, outside the plant. Nor can they re-organise the individual careers 
of permanent employees or freelance workers in a knowledge-driven 
economy and post-Fordist job design, where careers are no longer based 
on a vertical rise up through a company’s labour market, but connected 
with territorial mobility in the “boundaryless workplaces” of industrial 
districts
94.  
National collective agreements, that is, have no dynamic impact on the 
external labour market because their regulatory (and protective) logic is 
vertical, not horizontal.  
It is therefore possible that TEPs will have a greater destabilising effect 
than PECs on consolidated bargaining structures (in Italy the bargaining 
structure laid down by the Social Pact signed on 23
rd July, 1993, the so-
called Ciampi Protocol).  
It is therefore evident that their spread may lead to a resumption of 
measures to reform the collective bargaining structure and the re-writing 
of norms that establish the centrality and prevalence of national collective 
agreements, as they do in Italy.  
Making a major contribution to the destabilising spread of TEPs and at the 
same time ignoring the effects this will have on the stability of a system 
based on national collective agreements leaves trade unions a choice 
between two metaphors: they can either play the ostrich and bury their 
heads in the sand or become sorcerer’s apprentices.  
How to connect horizontal territorial bargaining and vertical bargaining at 
various levels, with respect to the distribution of responsibilities for 
contents, the actors involved, and the norms regulating the resolution of 
potential regulatory conflict, will in the near future be a key issue in the 
reform of bargaining structures.  
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b) The transformation of trade union representation 
The spread of TEPs has also affected consolidated models of trade union 
representation and has weakened the already debatable notion of 
representativeness, above all in systems like the Italian one where, with 
the notable exception of the civil service
95, it is empirically inferred by the 
bargaining power of the protagonists of traditional vertical bargaining (at 
an industry or plant level). 
  Just as PECs resume the apparently settled dialectic between trade 
unions and company-level workers’ representatives (see supra), the 
spread of territorial concertation via TEPs proposes a significant, if not 
central, role for a horizontal territorial trade union model that is 
uncommon in Europe, but was politically re-dimensioned in the Fordist 
era even in countries such as Italy where it had historically been the 
dominant model. 
If and when trade unions extend their sphere of action beyond the 
boundaries of the single firm to follow concerted territorial policies for 
access to employment and local development and also to regulate labour 
spread over the territory, it is evident that the traditional model of 
industrial representation based on vertical bargaining (always within the 
rigid confines of the enterprise, whether at a plant or at an industry-wide 
level) will be insufficient to express the new complexity of the interests 
being safeguarded and the policies pursued
96. 
In this way, one of the canonical functions of trade union representation 
is undermined: the task of selecting, aggregating and representing 
interests – albeit increasingly less homogeneous and uniform ones, even 
in a Tayloristic work organisation – which had as precise points of 
reference the stable boundaries of permanent employment relationship 
within a firm. and not a differentiated sequence of types of work and 
interests spread over a whole territory.  
In TEPs, trade unions have to forego their traditional task of safeguarding 
the specific professional interests of a homogeneous group typical of the 
craft unionism model, as well as their responsibility for aggregating and 
focusing the diverse interests of their traditional members on a single 
dominant interest, as was characteristic of industrial trade unionism in 
Continental Europe from the Fordist era to post-industrialism
97 .  
                                                 
95 B. Caruso “Rappresentanza e rappresentatività nel pubblico impiego riformato: 
‘l’interramento del cratere’ ”, LPA, v. 2, n.2, pp. 225-262. 
96 See B. Caruso “Il sindacato nel terzo millennio: tra crisi e rifondazione della 
rappresentanza”, forthcoming in RGL. 
97  A. Accornero, La parabola del sindacato: ascesa e declino di una cultura, Bologna, Il 
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In territorial concertation through TEPs, trade union organisations are 
forced to mediate between general, particular and differentiated interests 
that are often not only conflicting but even antagonistic, and refer not 
only to permanent employees but to a broad spectrum of workers that 
reflects the social fragmentation and new range of jobs and interests of a 
post-industrial society. 
 For example, if – as is provided for by specific measures of Territorial 
Pacts signed in Italy – the aim is to contribute towards increasing the 
economic development of areas especially suited to tourism, it will be 
necessary to accept working time policies that meet the flexibility 
requirements of trading (supermarkets and department stores ) and at 
the same time safeguard the interests of smaller businesses, protecting 
workers by not allowing unregulated flexibility and an unlimited amount 
of temporary jobs.  If the aim is to promote access to employment for 
weaker, underprivileged social groups, it will be necessary, even 
transitorily, to de-standardise wages; something which might clash, at 
least in theory, with the principle of formal parity
98. If the aim is to 
pursue environmental and urban renewal policies, it will be necessary to 
mediate and oppose interests that would be legitimately defendable and 
harshly defended by a vertical industrial trade union (e.g. the protection 
of employment in factories that are obsolete or a source of pollution,) 
etc..  
This new function of trade union representation thus stresses political 
mediation as opposed to mediation and protection via bargaining of 
professional interests. It emphasises the trade union’s role as an 
institutional political interlocutor, as opposed to that of representing 
partial interests. It throws trade unions into the cold mire of the political 
decision-making involved in territorial concertation, but it also forces 
them, rather schizophrenically, to contaminate their historic model of 
representation with models taken from other social experiences 
(environmentalism, voluntary associations, youth associations – 
everything that comes under the varied phenomenon of aggregation 
deriving from a generic, rather nihilistic, opposition to globalisation). 
In this way, however, the trade union movement undermines the 
foundations of its original representative legitimacy, its material grounds 
as well as the technical or formal criteria on which its mandate is based.  
Nevertheless, the trade union still remains an organisation of interests; 
the criteria, both formal/legal and political/institutional, on which its 
representativeness is based refer as always to presumed or actual 
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consensus of an electoral or associative nature received from its 
permanent rank and file. 
The erosion of its traditional membership thus inevitably forces the trade 
union to try to broaden its sphere of action at both a territorial level 
(TEPs) and a plant level (PECs).  
To the extent that the trade union tries to provide services rather than 
simply protecting the interests of employees, thus putting roots down in 
the territory and governing the external labour market together with 
other private and institutional actors, its classical point of reference and 
the measure of its representativeness change. 
Who is to have greater voice in the pursuance of territorial pact policy? 
The trade unions that represent the new contingent  workers, the new 
underprivileged social classes, the so-called “Grey Panthers” (pensioners) 
whose union membership has grown enormously in Italy thanks to 
successful territorial service policies, or rather the traditional vertical 
representation of a declining number of industrial workers?
99 How is the 
representativeness of the various trade unions to be measured, 
compared, weighed? Is the weighting merely political and institutional or 
are there other parameters involved? Does the political synthesis needed 
for this type of concertation of interests have anything at all to do with 
trade union legitimacy based on associative or electoral consensus and 
thus on representativeness? The apparent paradox (and not such an 
unaccountable one) is that the method of concertation – which the 
European Commission is trying to shift from the centre to the periphery – 
seems to combine its strong points with the vagueness and difficulty of 
the criteria used to estimate the representativeness of trade unions that 
are typical of concertation at a European Community level
100.  
Besides the specific issues of the criteria and context used to measure 
the representativeness of trade unions, it is evident that the greater their 
institutional involvement, the greater their top-down legitimisation, the 
weaker their representative legitimisation through consensus (bottom-
up); but the consensus deriving from their capacity to select and pursue 
policies to protect the interests of socially identified groups is the very 
raison d’etre of this historic social institution that played such a 
prominent role in the short century .  
                                                 
99 F. Piu “Lo Spi: una categoria generale nel territorio” Lavori.QRS, v. 1, n. 3, 2000, pp. 83-
90 
100 A. Lo Faro Funzioni e finzioni della contrattazione collettiva comunitaria, Milano, Giuffrè, 
1999, pp. 125 ff.; F. Guarriello “Spunti critici in tema di rappresentanza sindacale europea” 
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It is too early to say whether this is a symptom of an inevitable, 
irreversible decline or the difficult beginnings of a process of renewal and 




The purpose of this essay has been to create some sort of order in the 
variety of practices that go by the name of social partnership. These 
practices are spreading, albeit in an unbalanced way, throughout Europe 
and are to some extent indicative of new trends.  
There are two broad categories of decentralised social pacts, Pacts for 
Employment and Competitiveness (PECs) and Territorial Employment 
Pacts (TEPs). In each of these two categories there are significant 
differences in the tools used and aims pursued, but this does not prevent  
single pacts from being classified as belonging to one or the other of the 
categories. 
Although both types of Pact come under a general phenomenon of 
decentralisation of bargaining systems, they respond to two distinct 
forms of logic relating to collective relations, as is confirmed by their 
different formal and legal slants: PECs are essentially bilateral 
agreements in which public actors do not take a formal part, confining 
their role to that of external guarantors. PECs differ, however, from 
traditional distributive collective bargaining at a company level in their 
emphasis on the participatory method which in a sense seems to re-
propose, albeit on a new basis, the dualism between trade unions and 
workers’ representatives . As far as contents are concerned, the basic 
aim of PECs is flexibility in exchange for employment protection 
(especially for insiders); but another feature is the extension of their 
contents to include issues normally handled unilaterally by management 
(human resource policies, individual incentives, etc.).  
The distinguishing formal and legal feature of TEPs, on the other hand, is 
the direct, active participation of public actors, both at the moment of 
signing the pacts and in the subsequent implementation stages. As far as 
their contents are concerned, TEPs feature a wide range of public policies 
(the labour policies usually reflecting the four pillars of Community 
employment policy). TEPs show two general trends: in legal systems 
where public action is based on principles of administrative law, TEPs are 
among the most evident signs of the impact of economic globalisation on 
legal systems, with a consequent shift of state and sub-state 
administration from public law towards a more contract-oriented kind of 
action, even in pursuing general interests. But TEPs also show a trend 
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to the irresistible rise of institutional federalism in several European 
countries. They are a sort of anticipation of the scenarios for possible 
transformations in the basic structures of labour law, (traditionally laid 
down at a national level), which is undergoing a certain amount of 
pressure due to federalism-oriented institutional change. 
Finally, TEPs confirm the difficulty of uniform regulation via national 
collective agreements and the insufficiency of the representative role of 
trade unions, relegated within the evaporating confines of single firms 
and classical standard employment. 
Both TEPs and PECs have destabilising effects on social systems 
(industrial relations systems) and legal systems (labour law regulations), 
also affecting relationships between the sources of labour law, above all 
in those systems where the equilibrium has been traditionally based on 
the principle of the inderogability of statutory and contractual labour law; 
effects that labour lawyers have been forced to deal with for some time 
now
101.  
These phenomena are to some extent representative of the crisis facing 
the four fundamental pillars of post-war labour law, above all in 
Continental Europe (the nation state, the large Fordist firm, full 
employment, general trade union representation)
102. But they also reflect 
the great capacity for adaptation of labour law: they are the most evident 
sign of how labour law, embedded in the basic structure of the state, has 
succeeded in developing in a cultural humus, that of legal pluralism (and 
the related social practices) that is still its ultimate essence and the sense 
of its lasting vitality. 
  If it is true that it is perhaps more complicated than it appeared to be a 
few years ago for labour law scholars to understand the best way to use 
the law to combat unemployment and not only to consolidate the 
protection of standard employment
103, it is also true that labour law’s 
capacity to reinvent itself and its instruments (to rediscover, for example, 
                                                 
101 Among many others, A. Supiot, “Transformation du travail et devenir du droit du travail 
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Globalization”,  in T. Wilthagen. (ed.), Advancing theory in labour law , op. cit. in n. 32, pp. 
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http://www.labourlawjournal.it/index.htm  
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the effectiveness of contracts and consensus to regulate the labour 
market) is a tangible sign of its enduring capacity to keep up not only 
with modernity but also with what is to come. 